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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ualty etc. Co. of N. Y. (1917) 178 Ky. 369, 198 S. W. 1163. In determining
whether an injury occurred by "accidental means" it would appear that the
cause should govern the result, and not the result the cause, and that how-
ever unexpected the result may be, no recovery should be allowed under such
a provision unless there is something unexpected in the cause or means
which produced the result. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Johnson,
Adm'r'x. (1914) 91 Ohio St. 155, 110 N. E. 475.
In Caldwell v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (1924) 305 Mo. A. 619, 267 S. W.
907, 39 A. L. R. 56, a well-considered case, it was held that death resulting
from an unusual and unexpected obstruction of deceased's bowels by an op-
eration on him for hernia is not within a policy insuring against death
through accidental means. This case points out that the rule that injury
or death is produced by accidental means when the result is unusual, unex-
pected and unforeseen, seems largely to be built upon a misconception of the
language of the case of United States Accident Ass'n v. Barry, above. See
also Zack v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York (Mo. A. 1925) 272 S. W.
995.
In the principal case the act which preceded the injury was the drinking
of the supposed grain alcohol, and that which was"unforeseen, unexpected,
and unusual therein" was the fact that it contained wood alcohol, a deadly
poison. In other words, there was the unintentional and unexpected drink-
ing by insured of a poisonous substance. The case falls within the class of
cases involving the unintentional taking of poison, cases in which the in-
sured intended to swallow what he did, but was ignorant of the fact that it
contained poison. Such cases without exception have been held to involve
death by accidental means. Healey v. Mutual Accident Ass'n of the North-
west (1890) 133 Ill. 556, 25 N. E. 52; Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Dunlap
(1896) 160 Ill. 64, 43 N. E. 765.
The distinction between a voluntary act as the means and the unexpected
result as insisted upon by one line of cases seems more logical. Yet we can-
not completely divorce cause and effect. On a subject of such complexity
the factual situation in each individual case is conclusive. The tendency,
moreover, is to construe a policy of insurance more liberally in favor of the
insured, and where the words are without violence susceptible of two inter-
pretations, that which will cover the loss should in preference be adopted.
E. S., '31.
LIBEL-PUBLICATION-COMMUNICATION TO ATTORNEY AND TO STENOG-
RAPHER.-In Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co. (Tenn. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 255,
the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and had his attorney write
the defendant in regard to a balance alleged to be due him. The libelous
letter in question passed from the defendant to the attorney in the course
of the correspondence. The defendant dictated the letter to a stenographer
as indicated by the initials "C. K." on the left-hand side of the letter. The
Court held that: "Communications made to a libelled party's attorney cor-
responding for him regarding the specific matter in connection with which
Washington University Open Scholarship
202 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
the libelous matter is used, are not thereby given publication; and the inci-
dental dictation of such communication to an employee stenographer is not
a publication of libelous matter."
The general rule in regard to a publication of libel is that any communica-
tion of defamatory matter to a third person constitutes a publication. 36
C. J. 1223; Vicknair v. Daily States Pub. Co. (1923) 153 La. 677, 96 So.
599; Roberts v. English Mfg. Co. (1908) 155 Ala. 414, 46 So. 752. This
rule indicates that publication is purely a question of fact, and having de-
cided that a communication is a publication, it is necessary to decide
whether or not it is privileged. The Freeman case overlooks this distinction
and merely states that there has been no publication. Two New York
cases, Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corporation (1925) 212 App. Div. 366, 218
N. Y. S. 625 and Schinzel v. Vuyk (1926)'126 Misc. 202, 213 N. Y. S.
135, also overlook the distinction spoken of-although of course, the con-
clusion reached is of the same practical effect-and seem to be the best au-
thority for the Freeman decision, on the view that communications to an
attorney are held not to constitute a publication. In Wright v. Great
Northern Ry. Co. (Mo. A. 1916) 186 S. W. 1085, the court refused to term
a letter written in reply to a demand by libellee's agent a privileged com-
munication. In accord: Com. v. Pavitt (Penn.) 2 Del. Co. Rep. 16. See
also Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co. (1914) 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961, where
the court made a statement to the same effect, although the question in the
case was whether or not there was any libelous matter.
There is abundant authority concerning communications made to an em-
ployee of the libellant by way of necessity, as, for example, to a stenog-
rapher. Many courts refuse to characterize such publication as privileged
on the ground that the libelous matter did not concern any duties relating
to the business of the libellant or the firm by which he was employed.
Quillinan v. Stuart (1917) 380 Ont. L. Rep. 623; Pullman v. Hill (1891)
1 Q. B. 524. Nelson v. Whitten (1921) 272 F. 135 refused to extend the
privilege and held the communication to a stenographer to be a publication
because it was not in the usual course of a merchant's business to write
libelous letters. If he does so, he must write them himself or suffer the
consequences. In accord are Gambrill v. Schooley (1901) 93 Md. 48, 48
Atl. 730; Ferdon v. Dickens (1909) 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888; Sun Life
Assur. Co. v. Bailey (1903) 101 Va. 443, 44 S. E. 692; Adams V. Lawson
(Va. 1867) 17 Gratt. 250.
A more liberal view was expressed in Doxsius v. Goblet Freres (1894) 1
Q. B. 842 and Edmondson v. Birch & Co. (1907) 1 K. B. 371, where a publi-
cation to a stenographer was held privileged upon the ground that it was
the duty of the libellant in discharge of business to write the letter. This
is in line with the Freeman case. In Harper v. Hamilton Retail Grocer's
Ass'n (1900) 320 Ont. L. Rep. 295, the same reasoning was used to extend the
privilege to situations where the stenographer was an occasional employee
of the libellant. Cartw7ight-Caps Co. v. Fisehel (1917) 113 Miss. 359, 74
So. 278, also extends the privilege, basing the decision on the ground that a
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corporation is forced to act by agents. One case distinguishes between
situations where the libellant and stenographer are employed by a common
employer and those where the libellant is the employer. In the former no
publication is held to occur, while in the latter an unprivileged publication
takes place. Owen v. Ogilvie Pub. Co. (1898) 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. S.
1083. Such a distinction seems highly superficial and impractical, but has
been followed expressly by Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Jones (1916)' 18
Ga. App. 414, 89 S. E. 429, although repudiated in Berry v. City of N. Y.
Ins. Co. (1923) 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290. Globe Furniture Co. V. Wright
(1920) 49 App. D. C. 315, 265 F. 873, held that a communication to an em-
ployee other than a stenographer-the communication here being more than
a mere mechanical one for the purpose of typing a letter-was privileged.
The weight of modern authority seems to regard publication to a stenog-
rapher as privileged, but hardly justifies such publication to libellee's
attorney or agent unless the recent New York decisions cited are followed.
It is, of course, a serious question whether the plaintiff's reputation should
be sacrificed, in either of these situations, to modern business methods.
G. E. S., '31.
NGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE NOT A DEFENCE FOR VIOLATION
OF HIGHWAY STATUT.-In an action for damages for the killing of a dog,
the facts showed that plaintiff violated a statute declaring it unlawful for
the owner of a dog to allow it on the highway, and defendant violated an
act regulating the operation of motor vehicles on the highway in driving
on the wrong side of the road. Held, that the contributory negligence of
plaintiff was no defence in view of defendant's "gross negligence" in driv-
ing on the wrong side of the road. Craig et al. v. Stagner (Tenn. 1929)
19 S. W. (2d) 234.
The case is unusual in declaring a violation of a highway statute "gross
negligence." It must be noted that it was not shown that defendant was
conscious of the peril of the dog. The court relied entirely on the findings
of fact of the trial court which characterized defendant's conduct as "gross
negligence." The opinion merely says that defendant was driving on the
wrong side of the street. Plaintiff's negligence is found in the violation of
the statute relating to the presence of dogs on the highway. The violation
of a statute or ordinance is generally held to amount either to prima facie
negligence or negligence per se. Cauldwell v. Bingham & Shelley Co.
(1917) 84 Ore. 257, 163 Pac. 827; Alexander v. Industrial Board (1917) 281
Ill. 201, 117 N. E. 1040. In the principal case, the court followed the de-
cision in Cincinnati N. 0. & T. R. Co. v. Ford (1918) 139 Tenn. 291, 202
S. W. 72, and declared that the statute was designed to eliminate a public
nuisance and a violation of it was therefore negligence per se.
A host of authorities announce the rule that when defendant's conduct
amounts to wanton disregard of life or property, akin to willful misconduct,
the plaintiff's negligence is immaterial. Evans v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
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